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Abstract 
In England, state support for older people with disabilities consists of a national 
system of non-means tested cash disability benefits, and a locally-administered 
means-tested system of social care. Evidence on how the combination of the two 
systems targets those in most need is lacking. We estimate a latent factor structural 
equation model of disability and receipt of one or both forms of support. The 
model integrates the measurement of disability and its influence on receipt of 
state support, allowing for the socio-economic gradient in disability, and adopts 
income and wealth constructs appropriate to each part of the model. 
We find that receipt of each form of support rises as disability increases, with a 
strong concentration on the most disabled, especially for LA-funded care. The 
overlap between the two programmes is confined to the most disabled. Less than 
half of recipients of local authority-funded care also receive a disability benefit; a 
third of those in the top 10% of the disability distribution receive neither form of 
support. Despite being non means-tested, disability benefits display a degree of 
income and wealth targeting, as a consequence of the socio-economic gradient in 
disability and likely disability benefit claims behaviour.The scope for improving 
income/wealth targeting of disability benefits by means testing them, as some have 
suggested, is thus less than might be expected. 
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Policy points: 
• Receipt of disability benefits is much higher (14%) than receipt of 
publicly-funded care (3.3%) in the 65+ household population in England. 
• Receipt of each form of support rises as disability rises. Within the 
10% of the most disabled older people, the rate of receipt of disability 
benefits is 53%; 23% receive publicly-funded social care. 
• Overall, only about 50% of older recipients of publicly-funded care re- 
port receipt of disability benefits. Receipt of both forms of support is 
confined to the most disabled. 
• A third of the 10% of most disabled older people receive neither disa- 
bility benefits nor publicly-funded social care. 
• Disability benefits display a degree of income and wealth targeting 
without means-testing: people on low income are more likely to be 
disabled and to claim their entitlement to public support. 
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I. Introduction 
Increasing proportions of people are reaching the ages where the need for care 
and support with everyday activities becomes more likely. Worldwide, the num- 
ber of people aged 85 or over is projected to double over the next two decades 
(United Nations, 2017). As a consequence many countries must decide how best 
to use public resources to help people meet the needs associated with impaired 
functioning. An important issue is whether state support should be focussed on 
those least able to afford the cost of care via some form of means testing, or 
whether the need for care alone should determine eligibility for publicly funded 
support. 
There is a large literature on the merits of universalism versus targeting (usu- 
ally through some form of means testing) in welfare programmes. Much of it con- 
cerns their respective poverty/inequality reducing properties (e.g. Creedy, 1996; 
Lancker and Mechelen, 2015). The advantages of universalism over means testing 
are usually considered to be weaker adverse labour supply incentives and smaller 
administrative costs. The main disadvantage of universal systems is usually assu- 
med to be that more of a programme’s expenditure is likely to go to those who 
may not be in economic need (e.g. Besley, 1990). 
As described in more detail in Section II,  England has a two  part system    
of public support for older people with disabilities: a national system of cash 
disability benefits which are neither means tested nor taxable, administered by the 
Department for Work and Pensions; and a means-tested system of publicly 
subsidised social care administered by local government. It has sometimes been 
suggested that in comparison with social care, disability benefits are not well 
targeted (see e.g., Department of Health, 2009; Wanless, 2006) because they are 
not means tested and hence must be received by people not in economic need. 
However, in previous work we have shown that patterns of receipt of disability 
benefits for older people in England mimic to some degree the effect of means 
testing (Hancock et al., 2015). Descriptive analysis suggests that receipt of 
disability benefits and of publicly funded social care are both inversely related to 
(pre-disability benefit) income (Hancock et al., 2016).  
There has been relatively little assessment of the targeting of social care in 
England. A recent study Vlachantoni et al. (2015) used wave 4 (2008) of the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) to examine the socio-economic and 
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demographic factors associated with receipt of care. It found that the number of 
activities of daily living (ADLs), instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) 
and mobility activities with which respondents had difficulties were the strongest 
predictors of receiving publicly provided care. Income and wealth were not 
found to be significantly associated with receipt of publicly provided care, 
which is surprising given the means test. 
There is a considerable policy debate on the English system of support for 
older people with disabilities. Proposals for reform have included suggestions for 
closer integration of the two parts of the system and/or means testing of disability 
benefits (see e.g., Wanless, 2006; Department of Health, 2009; Commission on the 
Future of Health and Social Care in England, 2014; Department for Communities 
and Local Government, 2015).  
Decisions on potential reforms need to be informed by good evidence on how well the 
two parts of the current system of support work in combination in terms of reaching 
those in most need. We are not aware of any research on how the two parts work in 
combination. 
The first aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on means testing 
versus universalism, in the context of disability in later life taking the specific 
example of the two-part English system in which one part (social care) is 
stringently means tested while the other (cash disability benefits) is not. A 
second important aim is to address difficulties in the measurement of disability 
and in the construction of appropriate income measures for use in the assessment 
of the degree of income targeting. We extend previous research on Attendance 
Allowance (Hancock et al., 2015), adopting a similar latent variable approach to 
allow for the noise inherent in self-reported indicators of disability. We exploit 
new data on social care which were collected in wave 6 (2012) of ELSA, which 
allow us to expand the analysis to include receipt of publicly and privately funded 
social care as well as disability benefits. The analysis requires careful construction 
of income and wealth variables appropriate to each part of the model. Specific 
definitions of current income and wealth enter the social care means test rule in a 
particular way, but quite different concepts of income and wealth are relevant to 
the incidence and severity of disability and the propensity to claim entitlements 
to public support. Section II describes the systems of state-funded social care 
and disability benefits for older people operating in England. Section III reviews 
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methods used in previous research evaluating the targeting of disability benefits 
and explains our preferred econometric approach. Its implementation is set out 
in Section IV. Estimation results are presented in Section V and Section VI aids 
their interpretation through post-estimation analyses. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Social Care and Disability Benefits for Older People 
in England 
England has a two part system of public support for older people with disabilities: 
a national system of cash disability benefits administered by the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP); and a local government-administered system of social 
care. Disability benefits for older people consist of two main benefits: Atten- 
dance Allowance (AA) which can be claimed from age 65 onwards, and Disability 
Living Allowance (DLA)1 which must be claimed before reaching 65 but can con- 
tinue in payment beyond 65. AA and DLA are tax-free and not means tested 
(although their receipt can trigger additions to means-tested benefits). AA and 
DLA are intended to contribute towards the extra living costs that disabled pe- 
ople face, such as more expensive transport and the cost of help with daily living 
activities. AA has two possible weekly rates: currently £57.30 or  £85.30 from 
April 2018, while DLA payments range from £22.65 to £145.35. In May 2017, 
there were 0.8 million DLA recipients aged 65 and over, and 1.3 million AA 
recipients in England, comprising respectively 8% and 12% of the 65+ 
population.2 
Publicly funded social care in England3 is organised by Local Authorities 
(LAs). The system entails both a stringent disability test and a means test. Nati- 
onal guidance determines the principles of the means test for people receiving care 
in their own homes4 while leaving LAs discretion over some of its details. Even if 
care needs are assessed as high, there is no entitlement to publicly funded social 
care if total financial assets are above an upper threshold of at least £23,250 (some 
LAs use higher thresholds). The local authority will require eligible disabled older 
 
 
1From April 2013 DLA is gradually being replaced by  the Personal  Independence  Pay- 
ment (PIP), which differs from DLA in certain details. Very few over-65s are currently 
receiving PIPs. 
2Source: DWP tabulator tool (https://stat-xplore.dwp.gov.uk/; accessed 5 Dec 2017). 
3Similar arrangements exist in Wales and Scotland but personal care in Scotland is not 
means tested. In Northern Ireland social care is run by health and social care trusts. 
4Although ELSA covers some people in care homes, the information collected for them 
is insufficient to include them in our analysis. 
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people to meet the costs of their care up to the point where disposable income 
would fall below 125% of the guaranteed minimum income level, known as the 
‘Guarantee Credit’ ttC , which is embodied in the means-tested benefit system; 
there will be no entitlement to publicly funded social care if income is above this 
level plus the cost of care that the LA assesses as required. 
The reach of the social care system is much  less than that of the disabi-     
lity benefit system. In March 2017, the number of older people in England 
receiving long-term LA social care in their own homes or in a care home was  
400,300—around 4% of the total population in England aged 65+ (Health and 
Social Care Information Centre, 2017). There are no administrative figures on 
the overlap between the two forms of support. 
 
III. A coherent approach to measuring disability and 
targeting of public support 
Disability is a difficult concept. There are many different aspects of disability 
—its physiological/psychological sources, its severity, its intermittent or persistent 
nature, its incidence in relation to certain activities rather than others. Policy 
analysts have struggled with this complexity (Altman, 2001; Haveman and Wolfe, 
2000), but policy must necessarily impose simplicity by making a distinction bet- 
ween people judged eligible for public support and others who are not. 
Given the practical requirements of policy design, there are obvious advantages 
in using an approach to policy analysis that works with a simple 1-dimensional 
measure of disability at the individual level. Such a measure cannot be observed 
directly in household surveys, but must be constructed or inferred from information 
that surveys are able to provide. General self-reported measures of health status, 
such as presence of diagnosed medical conditions, are limited indicators of an 
individual’s functional dependence on basic tasks of everyday life (Wiener et al., 
1990) that is often the basis for determining eligibility for disability programmes. 
Disability indices based on difficulties with ADLs (Katz et al., 1963) and IADLs 
(Lawton and Brody, 1969) are perhaps the most widely used examples. 
There is a long history of attempts to evaluate disability benefit targeting in the 
research literature. One simple approach uses a single-equation framework in which 
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receipt of disability benefits is regressed on an assortment of disability/health 
indicators (or a summary scale of them) and other characteristics found to be 
relevant in influencing benefit receipt. See Banks et al. (2015) and Zantomio (2013) 
as empirical examples applied to the UK context. An alternative approach uses a 
two-stage method: principal component analysis (PCA) is first used to construct a 
disability index as a weighted average of the set of available indicators, with weights 
chosen so that the index captures as much of the covariation in the indicators as 
possible. At the second stage, the constructed measure is used for analysis of the 
policy response to disability and treated as if it were a directly measured variable. 
The PCA approach has been used in many contexts, for instance by Poterba et al. 
(2013) to measure general health in relation to wealth after retirement and by 
Croda et al. (2013) to assess target efficiency of disability programs for working- 
age people in Europe. It has three main drawbacks: first, the PCA approach does 
not take into account the different amounts of measurement noise in each self- 
reported health indicator (Bound et al., 2001). Second, using the derived PCA 
disability score in a classical econometric (regression) procedure generally leads to 
biased coefficient estimators (Liu, 1988). Third, the approach does not account for 
unobserved variability in true health (Deaton and Paxson, 2001; Graham, 2009) 
as well as in individuals’ survey reporting (Bago d’Uva et al., 2011). 
In our view, a better approach is to work with an explicit statistical model that 
allows for the coarse and error-prone nature of the survey indicators of disability 
and also integrates, within a comprehensive statistical framework, the two aspects 
of disability measurement and outcomes at the individual level of policy on public 
support for people with disabilities. The main advantage of this unified treatment 
over simpler two-stage methods is that both the survey indicators of disability and 
the measures of policy outcome contain information about the underlying disability 
state, so that it makes fuller use of the available information relating to disability. 
Our econometric approach is closely related to that proposed by e.g. Lee (1982) 
and recently used by Hancock et al. (2015)and Morciano et al. (2015), in conside- 
ring health status/disability as a latent concept. Suppose we have a 
representative sample of individuals and let di be the unobserved degree of 
disability for the ith sampled individual. We observe in the survey a set of J 
binary indicators of the difficulties caused by the individual’s health 
condition(s): Di1, . . . DiJ . 
The following measurement equations embody the assumption that the obser- 
ved indicators relate to the underlying disability via a linear function involving 
statistical “noise” represented by a set of mutually independent random errors 
ei1, . . . eiJ : 
D    = 
r
{
ı1 if λ0j + λ1jdi + eij > 0 
 
 (1) 
ı›0 otherwise 
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We  distinguish  three  care  states:   C   = 0  indicates  no  receipt  of  social  carei 
= = 
( ) 
P r(Bi = 1|di, Z i) = 
1 + eZiδ+θdi+Vi 
. (4) 
eXiβk+γkdi+ρkVi 
( =  | ) = 
+ + + + + + 
= 
d
=
 
= ditions (such as λ 01 0; λ11 1) required to fix the location and scale of latent 
 
 
 
 
and we allow the data to determine the degree of noise, σ2 var eij , in each of 
the survey indicators, by treating σ2 . . . σ2 as parameters to be estimated. The 
1 j 
coefficients λ11, . . . λ1J are the factor loadings, which reflect the sensitivity of each 
indicator as a measure of underlying disability. Although we assume that Dij 
contains binary self-reported indicators, our framework can be extended easily to 
continuous and Likert-scale response indicators as well as objective measures of 
health. 
We specify a regression model (the disability model ) of the relationship between 
underlying (latent) disability di and its socio-economic determinants summarised 
by a set of covariates W i: 
di W iα ui (2) 
where ui  is a N (0, σ2) random residual.  Subject to arbitrary normalisation con- 
disability, a disability model comprising only (1) and (2) could be estimated by 
maximum likelihood. Instead, we estimate them jointly with two further statistical 
relationships linking receipt of social care and receipt of disability benefit to latent 
disability, di. 
 
services; Ci  1 indicates receipt of only private care services;  and Ci 2 indica-  
tes receipt of public care services (with or without additional privately-purchased 
top-up). Conditional on the disability state di and a set of covariates Xi, the 
probabilities of the two types of care receipt are given by a multinomial logit 
structure: 
 
P r  Ci k di, X i 
1 eXiβ1   γ1di   ρ1Vi eXiβ2   γ2di   ρ2Vi 
, k 1, 2. (3) 
The other form of public support is disability benefit, receipt of which is indi- 
cated by the binary variable Bi. Conditional on disability di and a further set of 
covariates Zi, the probability of benefit receipt is specified as a logistic regression: 
eZ iδ+θdi+Vi 
We allow for residual correlation between equations (3) and (4) by including 
the latent N 0, 1 variable Vi to represent unobserved factors (such as access to 
informal support, attitudes to dependency, ability to negotiate the claims process) 
linking receipt of formal care and disability benefits. Without loss of generality, the 
coefficient of Vi in (4) is set to unity as an arbitrary normalization to identify the 
structure. Equations (1- 4) have been estimated simultaneously. Our approach 
therefore differs from the approach used by Poterba et al. (2010a,b, 2013)and 
Croda et al. (2013), where a PCA is used to derive a latent index which a) accounts 
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neither for measurement errors nor for the socio-economic -health gradient; and b) 
is used as exogenous covariate in a subsequent model of the outcome of interest. 
From a strict statistical viewpoint, if the model is correctly specified, it is preferable 
to estimate the measurement equation jointly with the outcome regression, and 
there is no need to estimate the latent variable separately. 
 
IV. Data and implementation of the statistical model 
We use data from wave 6 (May 2012-June 2013) of ELSA. ELSA is a nationally 
representative survey collecting data on health, disability, financial circumstances 
and well-being of people aged 50 and over (‘core members’) and their partners 
living in private households in England.5 Fieldwork began in 2002 and sample 
members have been re-interviewed at two-yearly intervals since then. The original 
ELSA cohort, interviewed in 2002/3, was drawn from households who responded 
to the 1998, 1999 and 2001 cross-sectional Health Survey for England (HSE). 
Refreshment cohorts drawn from later HSEs were added to the original ELSA 
sample to ensure the study continued to cover the youngest age group and to 
address attrition at older ages. 
Wave 6 of ELSA included new questions on receipt of, and payment for, social 
care, which were originally developed for use in the HSE (Balarajan et al., 2009; 
Blake et al., 2010; Curtis and Burns, 2015). They improve on questions in previous 
ELSA waves, distinguishing more clearly between respondents who receive social 
care with financial support from a Local Authority and those who rely on care 
purchased privately. The new questions follow modules on health and disability; 
questions on receipt of disability benefits appear later still in the questionnaire. 
The social care and disability benefit questions are thus not vulnerable to the 
“justification bias” that can arise if questions on receipt of public support for 
disability precede those on disability (Crossley and Kennedy, 2002). The new 
data allow us to estimate the gross cost of social care received, which is important 
in calculating an individuals liability (and ability) to pay for their care. 
Like the earlier versions, the new social care questions are asked only of people 
who report difficulties with ADLs or IADLs.  In contrast, receipt of disability 
 
 
5ELSA is the result of collaboration between the University College London, the In- 
stitute of Fiscal Studies (IFS), and the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen). 
The universities of Cambridge, Exeter and East Anglia provided expert advice on specific 
modules. Many of the health measures adopted in ELSA are comparable with those in the 
Health and Retirement Survey conducted in the US (Banks and Smith, 2012) and the Sur- 
vey of Health and Retirement in Europe (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al., 2005).  See documentation 
at http://www.elsa-project.ac.uk/ for a fuller description. 
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benefits is asked of all respondents even if they report no ADL/IADL difficulties. 
An assumption that people who report no ADL/IADL difficulties do not receive 
social care might bias our results towards a conclusion that publicly funded social 
care is better targeted than disability benefits: there would apparently be no 
‘leakage’ of social care spending to those who report no disabilities. However, we 
analysed the 2011 and 2012 HSEs which included the same social care questions 
but asked of all sample members aged 65 and over and found that less than 2% 
of the sample receiving LA-supported care reported no ADL/IADLs difficulties.6 
Moreover, the reach of LA-funded social care observed in ELSA is comparable 
with administrative figures: of the over-65 non care-home population, about 3.2% 
received LA-supported care in 2012. 
 
1. Sample selection 
Our analysis focus on the 65+ population as programmes for this age group which 
have been at the centre of policy debate. This age restriction also has the ad- 
vantage of reducing the potential for endogeneity whereby for working-age adults 
the availability of disability benefits and publicly-subsidised social care could re- 
duce labour supply and earnings, and hence pre-benefit income. Respondents with 
missing values for variables included in the analysis were excluded resulting in a 
total sample size of 5,125 (corresponding to about 97% of the total sample of 
core members aged 65+ interviewed in wave 6).  The ELSA sample is affected  
by non-response in the HSE, initial refusal to take part in ELSA and cumulative 
attrition after initial participation in ELSA (Bridges et al., 2015). We therefore 
apply the ELSA sample weights to mitigate the bias that could result from such 
non response. 
 
2. Disability measurement equations 
The binary disability indicators Dj are derived from questions on mobility, 
strength and dexterity; and on difficulties with ADLs/IADLs. These questions 
have been used in previous ELSA-based studies (Banks et al., 2015; Ermisch, 2014; 
Vlachantoni et al., 2015; Hancock et al., 2015). We also include indicators of the 
presence of housing adaptations to help meet disability needs and of whether re- 
spondents had poor eyesight, hearing problems or any visible physical or mental 
impairment as assessed by the survey interviewer. Although ELSA includes ob- 
jective physical and cognitive functioning tests, and a range of biomarkers, we do 
 
 
6In this paper we use ELSA rather than HSE because ELSA offers a larger sample size 
and collects fuller income information. 
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not exploit them here to limit potential bias associated with non-random consent 
to these tests7. Table A.1 in the Appendix A provides the full list of 30 indica- 
tors used in the measurement equations, together with their means and standard 
errors. 
 
3. Latent disability equation 
In the latent disability equation, the covariates W i represent all the major influ- 
ences on later-life disability. As far as possible they should capture circumstances 
and resources over the life-course that may affect current health including diag- 
nosed health conditions and socio-economic and demographic factors. We include 
in W i indicators of diagnosed physical conditions (such as stroke, cancer, lung 
disease, asthma, arthritis and osteoporosis), chronic cognitive conditions (such as 
Parkinson, Alzheimer, dementia and other cognitive degenerative disorders) and 
cardio-vascular diseases (such as heart problems, diabetes, cholesterol, angina and 
high blood pressure). Diagnosed conditions are included in W i rather than in Dj 
as it is generally accepted that chronic conditions are potential causes of functio- 
nal disability rather than measures of functional disability (Johnson and Wolinsky, 
1993; Verbrugge and Jette, 1994). 
Early-life living standards and parental socio-economic status are known to in- 
fluence individuals accumulation of advantage or disadvantage in socio-economic 
status and health (Currie, 2009). We therefore include in W i indicators of the 
respondent’s father’s economic status when the respondent was 14 years old: whet- 
her he worked in casual jobs; was economically inactive, unemployed or prevented 
from working by disability; and if economically active whether or not he was in  
a managerial, professional or technical job or running his own business. W i also 
includes the respondent’s age on leaving education and a dummy variable indi- 
cating whether receiving or expecting to receive either an employer pension or a 
personal/private pension. 
The income and wealth variables included in W i are specified to capture li- 
fetime economic resources.  Wealth includes financial, net primary housing  and 
 
 
7Physical examination and performance data (e.g. walking speed and tests on cognitive 
function) are affected by relevant and non-ignorable item non-response. About 15% of our 
sample did not complete the first and the second walking tests. The reach of disability 
benefits (B) and LA-supported care (C2) was higher among those who did not undertake 
the test (B  32.4%; C2  12.5%) than among performers (B 9.2%; C2  0.1%).  Cognitive 
tests were impaired/not performed for about 15.6% of our sample, with the receipt of B 
and C2 higher among those who did not perform the tests. Similar patters occurred in 
the comparison of those who did and did not participate in the nurse visit. 
12  
 
 
 
 
physical (other properties, businesses and other physical assets) wealth. Income 
comprises income from pensions and investments (interests, rent, dividends, pri- 
vate pensions, annuities) and earnings, net of income taxes and housing costs. 
Disability-related benefits (whose receipt is clearly determined by disability rather 
than being an influence on disability) and means-tested benefits (where entitlement 
depends on other current income and wealth) are excluded. Income and wealth 
variables totalled for the household and then ascribed to each household 
member, are expressed per capitain constant 2015 prices. Additional personal 
characte- ristics included in W i are age, gender and current partnership status 
(married or cohabiting versus single). 
 
4. Receipt of care and disability benefit equations 
We identify disability benefit recipients as respondents who reported receiving 
either AA or DLA. Recipients of LA-funded care are defined as those who reported 
that a LA contributed towards the cost of their social care and the estimated gross 
cost of their social care was greater than the contribution that was made by the 
individual or family towards the cost. Appendix B details how we estimate the 
gross cost of social care received by respondents and the contribution to its cost 
made by a LA. 
Receipt of public social care and disability benefits is determined partly by 
claim behaviour and partly by eligibility rules and their administration. Eligible 
individuals may fail to claim because, for example, they think a claim would be 
unsuccessful, there are costs associated with claiming, they lack the skills to navi- 
gate the claim system or they fear stigmatization. Although these factors are not 
observable directly, there are variables known to be associated with claim behavi- 
our which can be included in Xi and Zi in the semi-reduced form equations (3) 
and (4). Following previous relevant work (Zantomio, 2013; Hernandez and Pud- 
ney, 2007; Pudney et al., 2006) we include, as likely influences on claim behaviour, 
age, gender, current partnership status (married or cohabiting versus single), age 
left education and whether the respondent is a social renter. The last of these is 
intended in part to capture contact with the welfare system which may increase 
propensity to claim entitlements to social care or disability benefits. 
In addition to the means test, income also influences individual decisions to ap- 
ply to Local Authorities for social care, since the ability to self-finance is strongly 
related to current income. We construct the vector X in a way that approxi- 
mates the effect of the means test super-imposed on claim behaviour. Therefore, 
in addition to socio-demographic variables listed above, the vector X contains 
indicators of whether the respondent meets each of the income and assets compo- 
nents of the means test and if not, how far their income or assets are above the 
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Assets: (F − 23, 250)/23, 250 if F > 23, 250 ; 0 otherwise. 
(5) 
 
 
 
 
corresponding threshold. An individual is calculated to meet the income test if 
Y c 1.25ttC, with Y representing assessable income and c an estimate of the 
gross cost of care received. Assessable income differs from the measure of income 
included in W because it includes disability-related and means-tested benefits. 
The test on financial assets (F ) is based on whether the net per-capita amount of 
financial assets reported by the respondent and any partner falls below £23,250.8 
Where respondents had income or assets above the relevant thresholds, we 
computed measures of the distances from these thresholds as follows: 
 
Income:    (Y − c − 1.25ttC)/(c + 1.25ttC) if Y − c > 1.25ttC ; 0 otherwise 
 
Further details of the construction of these measures and the gross cost of care, 
c, are included in Appendix B.  Locally weighted regressions of the probability  
of receiving LA-subsidised care by the degree to which respondent appears to be 
beyond the means test thresholds are given in Appendix Figures B.1 and B.2. They 
suggest that we are able to simulate the income test quite well (the empirical rate 
of LA-funded care receipt is virtually zero above the threshold), but the asset test 
is harder to simulate accurately. This could be due to measurement problems with 
self-reported measures of wealth. But LAs have some discretion in implementing 
national guidance on the means test, and it is possible that they make more use 
of that discretion in the assets test than in the income test. 
The absence of a means test for disability benefits implies that in equation (4) 
income influences benefit receipt primarily through the incentive to claim, and the 
income effect therefore operates in a smoother way than for receipt of LA-funded 
social care. Construction of the covariate vector Zi reflects this, with pre-disability 
benefit income (net of income taxes and housing costs) and financial wealth entered 
as continuous variables. 
Rates of receipt of public support and mean values for elements of W i, Xi 
and        Zi        are        given        in         Appendix         Table         A.2.  
 
 
8In practice the income test can be more complicated in the case of couples with 
LAs having some discretion over how couples are assessed. Appendix B presents some 
sensitivity analysis of the form of assessment for couples but the effects on the main 
econometric results presented in Section V were found to be negligible. 
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V. Estimation results 
Factor loading estimates for equations (1) are plotted in Figure 1 with their 95% 
confidence intervals. They represent the effect of latent disability on each disability 
indicator. All factor loadings have the expected positive sign, meaning that 
higher underlying disability generates more reported difficulties with mobility, 
strength and dexterity, limitations in (I)ADLs and so on. They are also all  
statistically significant at the 1% level, most of them very strongly. The factor 
loading for the self-reported disability indicators are generally larger than those 
for the interviewer reported measures. The largest factor loadings  are for 
activities requiring mobility/strength, bathing, preparing hot meals and 
shopping. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Factor loadings and 95% CIs of the measurement model for latent disability 
 
walking 100 yards 
sitting 2 hours 
getting up from chair 
climbing several flights of stairs 
climbing one flight of stairs 
stooping, kneeling or crouching 
reaching or extending arms 
pulling or pushing large objects 
lifting or carrying weights 
picking up 5p coin from table 
ADL: dressing 
ADL: walking across a room 
ADL: bathing or showering 
ADL: eating 
ADL: getting in and out of bed 
ADL: using the toilet 
IADL: using map 
IADL: recognising when in danger 
IADL: preparing a hot meal 
IADL: shopping for groceries 
IADL: making telephone calls 
IADL: communication 
IADL: taking medications 
IADL: doing work around house 
IADL: managing money 
poor eyesight* 
hard of hearing* 
visible physical impairment* 
visible mental impairment* 
has adaptations in property 
 
 
0 .25 .5 .75 1 1.25 
Factor loading 
 
Notes:  the factor loading associated with “walking 100 yards” is constrained to be one    
to normalise the scale of the continuous latent variable. Constraining alternative factor 
loadings yielded virtually identical results. ( ) indicator constructed using the interviewer’s 
report (see text for details). 
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Structural parameters for the latent disability equation (equation 2) are re- 
ported in the first column of Table 1. The presence of a degenerative cognitive 
condition such as Parkinson, Alzheimer and dementia increases the latent disabi- 
lity index (d) by 3.01 standard deviation units whereas the presence of physical 
conditions such as stroke, cancer, lung disease, asthma, arthritis/osteoporosis pro- 
duces an estimated increase of the latent index of about 1.04. Suffering from 
cardiovascular diseases produces an increase of 0.61 standard deviation units in d. 
Latent disability increases significantly with age and it is higher for single pe- 
ople than for those who are married or cohabiting. It is also higher for women than 
men. The estimated effects on disability of early-life living standards as measured 
by father’s socio-economic status, own education, home-ownership, membership of 
private pension plans, income and financial wealth all contribute to a consistent 
picture of a socio-economic gradient in disability. 
The second and third columns of Table 1 show estimates of the effects of 
covariates on the log odds of receipt of privately funded care (column 2) and LA- 
funded care (column 3) as opposed to non-receipt of care. Disability level, age, 
education and satisfying the income component of the means test all exert positive 
influences on being a care recipient. The effects of disability and satisfying the 
income test are both larger for receipt of LA-funded care than for receipt of only 
privately-funded care whereas the effects of age and education are smaller for LA- 
funded care. Living with a partner reduces the odds of receiving care rather than 
no care but more so for LA-funded care than for privately-funded care. Having 
assets above the means test threshold reduces the odds of being in receipt of 
either form of care but the coefficient estimate is statistically significant for only 
privately-funded care. The extent to which assets exceed the means test 
threshold does not have a statistically significant effect on receipt of privately 
paid-for or LA-funded care. We found no significant gender or housing tenure 
effects at conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Estimates of the parameters of equation (4) for receipt of disability benefits, 
are reported in the final column of Table 1. Latent disability has a dominant 
positive effect on receipt of disability benefits, as we would expect. But other 
coefficients suggest the existence of further important determinants. Income and 
wealth both have significant negative effects on benefit receipt despite the absence 
of means-testing and we interpret this as evidence of strong economic incentive 
effects on the propensity to claim benefit. The strong positive coefficient for being 
a social renter is a common finding in studies of take-up behaviour and we have 
previously argued that this is likely to be related to access to advisory and support 
services that many social landlords offer. The negative impact of education and 
female gender are also typical findings, although the explanation for them is less 
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clear. In contrast to receipt of care, neither age nor cohabitation is significantly 
associated with receipt of disability benefits. 
We find evidence of positive correlation between receipt of care services and 
disability benefits. The estimated cross-equation coefficients ρ1 and ρ2 are highly 
significant for both categories of care, suggesting there are indeed unobservable 
factors influencing receipt of both types of support. The correlation between di- 
sability benefit receipt and privately purchased care is slightly higher than the 
correlation between disability benefits and LA-funded care. 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Structural parameters of the latent disability equation and for receipt of social care and disability benefits (AA/DLA) 
 
Latent Receipt of care Receipt of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d 
 
Notes: Observations: 5,125. Significance level: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
Goodness of fit statistics: Log-likelihood: -37495.99; Degree of freedom: 106; AIC: 75203.99; BIC: 75897.43. 
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 disability private payers LA supported disability benefits 
Latent disability index  0.494*** 0.726*** 0.543*** 
Diagnosed cognitive conditions (1=yes,0=no) 3.007***    
Diagnosed physical conditions (1=yes,0=no) 1.039***    
Diagnosed cardio-vascular diseases (1=yes,0=no) 0.613***    
Age in years 0.143*** 0.114*** 0.076*** -0.012 
Married or cohabiting -0.456*** -1.297*** -1.530*** -0.081 
Female 0.858*** 0.304 0.011 -0.378*** 
Age left education (in years) -0.194*** 0.266*** 0.234*** -0.090** 
Main father’s job when respondent aged 14 (1=yes,0=no):     
casual jobs, retired, unemployed, sick/disabled 0.483**    
manager or senior official, self-employer -0.053    
Rights in private/employer pension scheme(s) -0.481***    
Home owner (1=yes,0=no) -1.257***    
Social renter (1=yes,0=no)  -0.152 0.168 0.672*** 
Per capita net wealth (£’00,000) -0.094***    
Per capita original income (£’000) -0.114**    
Income test met (1=yes,0=no)  0.528** 1.294***  
Proportional distance above income test threshold  -0.285 -1.042**  
Assets above the means test threshold (1=yes,0=no)  -0.412* -0.299  
Proportional distance above asset means test threshold  0.022 -0.141  
Per-capita net pre-disability income (£’000)    -0.263** 
Per-capita net financial wealth (£’00,000)    -0.429*** 
Constant  -18.158*** -18.643*** -6.449*** 
Variance σ2 10.358***    
Covariance parameter ρj  0.969*** 0.882*** 1 
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To aid interpretation of the estimated equations for receipt of care and benefits, 
Figures 2 and 3 plot how the average predicted probabilities of receipt of disability 
benefits and care vary according to predicted disability (d) and original income 
(measured before disability and means-tested benefits) respectively. For this pur- 
pose, we group sample members into deciles of predicted latent disability9 and of 
income. Figure 2 illustrates three main points. Firstly, predicted receipt of all 
forms of support is negligible in the lowest 30-40% of the distribution of estimated 
disability but rises thereafter. Secondly, from the 30th to 40th percentiles of disa- 
bility, predicted receipt of disability benefits starts to rise and increasingly exceeds 
predicted receipt of either publicly funded or privately purchased care. Thirdly, 
predicted receipt of privately purchased care is higher than receipt of LA-funded 
care until somewhere between the 9th and 10th decile so that it is only at the very 
highest disability levels that more people receive LA-funded care than purchase 
care exclusively privately. There is thus a very strong concentration of publicly 
funded care on those with the highest levels of disability. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Average predicted probabilities of care and disability benefit receipt by decile of latent 
disability 
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9For comparison, the median number of mobility difficulties and ADL limitations re- 
ported in the lowest 30% of d is 0.  In the 4th  and 5th  deciles of d, the median number   
of mobility difficulties reported rise to one; to 2 (5) in the 6th (8th) decile. In the 10th 
decile of d, the median number of mobility difficulties reported is 8 (over 10) whereas the 
median number of ADL limitation reported is 3 (over 6). 
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As we would expect given the means test, predicted receipt of LA-funded care 
falls with income (Figure 3).   A very striking feature of Figure 3 is the sharp   
fall in the average predicted probability of receiving disability benefits as income 
rises, despite the fact that disability benefits are not means-tested. Also of note 
is the fall in predicted probability of purchasing care privately as income rises. 
Underlying both of these observations is the (negative) socio-economic gradient of 
disability which is captured in the structural equations approach. In the case of 
privately purchased care, the restriction of LA-funded care to those who not only 
have low means but also have high disability is likely to result in people with lower 
but still substantial levels of disability having to purchase care themselves. Given 
the socio-economic gradient of disability, they will typically have lower incomes 
and assets than those with no or low levels of disability. 
In summary, we found evidence of considerable targeting, by disability and in- 
come, of each of the two systems of public support for older people with disabilities. 
Our estimates predict that at all levels of disability and income, the probability 
of receipt of disability benefits is higher than that for LA-funded care. However, 
the rate at which that probability falls as income rises appears to be higher for 
disability benefits than for LA-funded care, despite the stringent means test for 
the latter and no means test for the former. 
FIGURE 3 
Average predicted probabilities of care and disability benefit receipt by decile of income 
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FIGURE 4 
Observed rates of receipt of cash-disability benefits, LA-funded care and both by decile 
of  latent disability 
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VI. Interpretation of results 
 
In this section we extend our use of the predicted disability levels and receipt of 
support to shed more light on the workings of the dual system of support for older 
people with disabilities. 
Using the predicted disability level, d, we can see that the observed rates of both 
care and disability benefits are zero below the 4th decile of disability (Figure 4). 
Sample members start to receive disability benefits at the 4th decile of disability 
where receipt is about 3.5%. No sample members report receipt of LA-funded 
care below the median level of disability and at the median level just 0.4% are 
recipients. Receipt of LA-funded care rises to about 3.2% at the 8th decile of 
predicted disability. At that point the observed rate of disability benefits is much 
higher at about 19%. 
Each programme seems well targeted towards more disabled older people. Ra- 
tes of receipt of each rise significantly in the top 20% of disability. Within the 10% 
of the most disabled individuals, the rate of receipt of disability benefits is 53% 
and 23% receive LA-funded care. 
Given the stringent disability and means tests that apply to publicly funded 
social care, and the much higher overall rate of receipt of disability benefits, it is 
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not surprising that relatively few recipients of disability benefits (around 11%) also 
receive publicly funded care. A more surprising finding is that the proportion of 
recipients of publicly funded care who also receive disability benefits is under one 
half (49%). Even among the 10% of most disabled people, only 60% of the 23% 
who receive publicly funded social care also receive disability benefits. Moreover 
some 33% of older people in the top 10% of disability receive neither form of 
support. 
In Figure 5, we compare the implications of the estimated models, for four 
illustrative individuals aged 73 (the median age observed in the sample), for a 
spectrum of disability levels that correspond to the median values of d observed in 
each decile. Each of the individuals has left school at 14 which was the minimum 
school leaving age allowed at the time, with income and financial asset set at 
125% of the GC level and at the upper capital threshold respectively. Two of the 
cases are women living with their partners. One is a homeowner (case A) and 
one is a social renter (case B ). The two other cases are widows living alone: a 
homeowner (case C ) and a social renter (case D ). A number of points emerge 
from these comparisons. First, other things equal, being a social renter increases 
the predicted probability of receiving disability benefits but has little effect on 
the probability of receiving LA-funded care. On the other hand, living alone has 
virtually no effect on the predicted probability of receiving disability benefits but 
does increase the probability of receiving LA-funded support. 
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FIGURE 5 
Predicted probabilities of cash-disability benefits and LA-funded care by level of 
disability for two benchmark cases 
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In Figure 6, we examine how the estimated probability of receiving support 
varies by income level for a widow who is a social renter (case D above), with 
either a high or a median level of disability, corresponding to the median values of 
d observed in the 10th and 5th deciles of its distribution. Below 125% of GC, the 
predicted rates of receipt when disability is high is about 26% for LA-funded care 
and approximately two-thirds for disability benefits. Because of the means-test, 
the predicted probability of receiving LA-funded care drops sharply after the 125% 
of GC threshold to close to zero. Despite the absence of a means test for disability 
benefits, their predicted rate of receipt also declines as income rises. The strict 
disability test for publicly funded care means that predicted receipt is virtually 
zero at all levels of income when disability at the median level. Predicted rates of 
disability benefit receipt are much lower than for the high disability case but still 
fall slightly as income rises. 
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FIGURE 6 
Predicted probabilities of cash-disability benefits and LA-funded care by income for a 
73-year old social renter widow 
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VII. Conclusions 
Much of the previous literature on the design of disability programmes considers 
working-age adults, where labour market attachment is a primary concern (Burk- 
hauser et al., 2014; Bound and Burkhauser, 1999, see e.g.) and is the focus of 
policy reforms. Instead, our interest here is in older people, typically well beyond 
retirement age, and in programmes that address care needs and the personal costs 
of disability, rather than act as earnings replacement. 
This paper is motivated by the considerable policy debate on the respective 
roles of the English cash disability benefit and social care systems in providing 
help for older people with care needs, with various suggestions for integrating 
the two systems. In November 2017, the UK Government announced that it 
plans to consult on proposals to reform care and support for older people via a 
Green paper to be published in Summer 201810.This is the most recent in  a long 
line of attempts to identify reform options for the English system of sup- port 
for older people with care needs (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1996; Royal 
Commission on Long Term Care of the Elderly, 1999; Wanless, 2006; Department 
 
 
10https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-set-out-proposals-to-reform- 
care-and-support 
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of Health, 2009; Commission on Funding Care and Support, 2011; Commission 
on the Future of Health and Social Care in England, 2014). Any proposals for 
reform of the systems need to draw on good evidence on how well the current sy- 
stems, taken together, are targeted on those in most need. In this paper, we have 
therefore investigated the targeting properties of the English two-part system of 
support for older people with disabilities. We have extended pre- vious research 
in four ways. First, we consider both parts of the system in contrast to previous 
research looking only at disability benefits (Hancock et al., 2015; Zan- tomio, 
2013) or only social care receipt (Vlachantoni et al., 2015). Secondly, our 
statistical approach integrates the measurement of disability and its influence 
on receipt of each type of state support in a single framework, allowing for the 
socio-economic gradient in disability, whereas previous literature has used 
simple discrete indicators of di- sability and single equation frameworks. 
Thirdly, we have adopted definitions of income and wealth appropriate to each 
part of the statistical model. This may explain why we find significant income and 
wealth influences on receipt of publicly subsidised social care where Vlachantoni 
et al. (2015) found none. Finally, we have also been able to exploit newly available 
data on social care collected in wave 6 (2012) of ELSA which enables us to 
distinguish better between those who receive publicly subsidised care and those 
who pay the full cost of care. 
We find that receipt of each of disability benefits and LA-funded care rises  
as disability increases (a finding consistent with previous research), with a strong 
concentration on those with the highest levels of disability, more so for LA-funded 
care than for disability benefits. The overlap between the two programmes occurs 
entirely among the most disabled population.  It is striking that less than half   
of recipients of local authority-funded care also receive a disability benefit, while 
amongst those in the top 10% of the disability distribution, a third receive neither 
form of support. As we would expect given the means test, receipt of LA-funded 
care falls as income rises. As we have found in previous research using different data 
(Hancock et al., 2015), there is also considerable income and wealth targeting of 
disability benefits, even though they are not means tested. This is explained 
partly by the socio-economic gradient in disability but is also likely to reflect 
claim behaviour. The scope for improving income/wealth targeting of disability 
benefits by means testing them, as some have suggested, is thus less than might 
be expected. 
Under a two part system, the chance of a disabled person being awarded at least 
some support is likely to be greater than under a single system given the need to 
make a claim and the inevitable judgements involved by system administrators in 
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disability assessment. The limited overlap in receipt of the two forms of support 
suggests that combining them into a single system risks increasing the already 
substantial proportion of the most disabled older people who receive neither form 
of support. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
TABLE A.1 
Means and standard errors (s.e.) for the binary indicators of disability (1=has difficulty, 
0=does not have difficulty) 
 
 mean s.e. 
Mobility: difficulty walking 100 yards 20.31% 0.402 
Mobility: difficulty sitting 2 hours 14.48% 0.352 
Mobility: difficulty getting up from chair after sitting long periods 30.32% 0.460 
Mobility: difficulty climbing several flights stairs without resting 43.56% 0.496 
Mobility: difficulty climbing one flight stairs without resting 22.39% 0.417 
Mobility: difficulty stooping, kneeling or crouching 46.50% 0.499 
Mobility: difficulty reaching or extending arms above shoulder level 14.42% 0.351 
Mobility: difficulty pulling or pushing large objects 24.12% 0.428 
Mobility: difficulty lifting or carrying weights over 10 pounds 30.97% 0.462 
Mobility: difficulty picking up 5p coin from table 8.07% 0.272 
ADL: difficulty dressing, including putting on shoes and socks 16.42% 0.370 
ADL: difficulty walking across a room 5.19% 0.222 
ADL: difficulty bathing or showering 13.24% 0.339 
ADL: difficulty eating, such as cutting up food 3.29% 0.178 
ADL: difficulty getting in and out of bed 6.99% 0.255 
ADL: difficulty using the toilet, including getting up or down 4.28% 0.202 
IADL: difficulty using map to figure out how to get around strange place 6.73% 0.251 
IADL: recognising when in physical danger (wave 4 onwards) 2.04% 0.141 
IADL: difficulty preparing a hot meal 6.94% 0.254 
IADL: difficulty shopping for groceries 13.86% 0.346 
IADL: difficulty making telephone calls 3.55% 0.185 
IADL: difficulty with communication (wave 4 onwards) 5.42% 0.226 
IADL: difficulty taking medications 3.19% 0.176 
IADL: difficulty doing work around house and garden 20.64% 0.405 
IADL: difficulty managing money, e.g. paying bills, keeping track expenses 5.00% 0.218 
Blind or poor eyesight* 1.67% 0.128 
Deaf or hard of hearing* 3.82% 0.192 
Has physical impairment/illness* 1.64% 0.127 
Has mental impairment, lost concentration, very nervous or anxious* 3.36% 0.180 
Has adaptations in property 23.28% 0.423 
Observations 5,125  
Notes:∗  indicator constructed using the interviewer’s report. 
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Notes: 
(
( ): when respondent aged 14. 
): Measured as proportionate distance above the means test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A.2 
Means and standard errors (s.e.) for covariates used in the equations for latent disability, 
receipt of care and receipt of disability benefits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main father’s job a :  casual jobs, retired, unemployed, sick/disabled  5.11% 
Main father’s job(a): manager or senior official, self-employer 23.32% 
 
 
Income ability to self-finance b  c 0.850 2.463 
Assets above the means test  met threshold 59.39% 0.491 
Wealth ability to self-finance b  c 4.029 11.071 
Social Care received: 
Do not receive care 92.75% 0.259 
Private-funded 4.02% 0.196 
LA-supported 3.23% 0.177 
In receipt of cash disability benefits (AA/DLA) 13.92% 0.346 
Observations 5,125  
a 
b 
(c): Sample mean and s.e. has been computed here only among members that do not meet 
 
 the eligibility criteria.
the eligibility criteria. 
 mean s.e. 
Diagnosed cardio-vascular diseases 17.17% 0.377 
Diagnosed physical conditions 12.05% 0.326 
Diagnosed cognitive conditions 3.17% 0.175 
Age 74.5 7.284 
Cohabitation 61.66% 0.486 
Women 54.58% 0.498 
Age left education: 
14 or under/never 
 
19.73% 
 
0.398 
15 years old 37.38% 0.484 
16 years old 18.21% 0.386 
17 years old 7.33% 0.261 
18 years old 5.40% 0.226 
19 years old or over 11.95% 0.324 
Whether home owner 80.85% 0.393 
Whether is a social renter (LA or H. Ass) 14.55% 0.353 
 0.220 
 0.423 
Receiving/contributing/retained rights in a private/occupational pension(s) 67.96% 0.467 
Per capita net wealth (£’00,000) 2.039 3.419 
Per capita net financial  wealth (£’00,000) 0.371 0.520 
Per capita original (pre-disability and means-test benefits) income (£’000 pm) 1.059 1.589 
Per capita (pre-disability benefits) income  (£’000 pm) 1.024 0.623 
Income test met 37.48% 0.484 
 
32  
 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Simulating the means test for publicly fun- 
ded social care 
In the main text we  describe the construction of covariates used in the receipt  
of care equations designed to capture the effects of the income and asset tests 
which determine whether someone is eligible for publicly funded social care. This 
requires us to estimate the gross cost of the care received by individuals in the 
sample. In this appendix we describe how this cost is estimated and also present 
some sensitivity analysis for the case of couples where Local Authorities have some 
discretion over how they treat joint/shared income. 
 
1. Estimating the gross cost of care and any Local Authority con- 
tribution to it 
Each of five possible sources of social care were assigned an hourly cost in 2012 
prices, based on data from Curtis (2013). The five sources were home care, reable- 
ment, warden, cleaner, handyman. These were sources mentioned by respondents 
as providing help with ADL/IADL tasks. For each type of care, respondents were 
asked how many hours of care they received each week. If they were not able to 
give an exact number of hours they were asked first to say in which of nine bands 
of hours, the hours of care they received fell. If they could not select from these 
nine bands they were then offered three bands to select from. Where respondents 
could not give an exact number of hours of care, they were assigned the mid-point 
of the band they selected. This number was then multiplied by the appropriate 
hourly rate and aggregated across types of care to provide an estimate of the gross 
cost of care received by each respondent. 
Respondents were asked a series of questions which enabled us to (i) identify whet- 
her a Local Authority contributed to the cost of any care they received and (ii) to 
estimate the total payment that respondents or their families made towards the 
cost of their care. 
Where the Local Authority was identified as contributing to the cost, its contri- 
bution was taken as the excess, if any, of the gross cost of care over what the 
recipient (or family) paid towards their care. Recipients of LA-funded care were 
then deemed to be those for whom the LA contribution to the gross cost of care 
was strictly positive. 
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2. Sensitivity analysis for the treatment of couples in the means 
tests for social care 
National guidance encourages LAs to take into account only the disabled persons 
income and not those of any partner. However, they must adjust the assessment 
where a partner is financially dependent on the person who is being assessed (De- 
partment of Health, 2013). 
Let c be the gross value of care received and YLA be the income the LA com- 
pares with the means test threshold of 125% of the Guarantee Credit level. In the 
case of a single person YLA  Y   c   where Y  is the individual’s disposable (after 
tax and housing costs). For a partnered person the question is whether and how 
the income of the partner (Y p) and the cost of any care s(he) receives (cp) is taken 
into account. We allow for three possibilities: 
1. LAs assess on the basis of half the total disposable income of the individual 
and partner less the individuals care costs: YLA = 
Y +Y − c. 
p 
 
 
 
 
2. LAs compute the total income less the total care costs and assess on the 
basis of half the result: YLA = 
(Y +Y p)−(c+cp) .    
3. LAs assess eligibility by using the lesser of individual disposable income less 
care costs and the result at 2) above: YLA = min(Y − c, (Y +Y )−(c+c ) ). In p p 
other words the income assessment is the most favourable from the point of 
view of the individual. This is the income definition used in equation 5 of 
the paper. 
Figure B.1 graphs the locally weighted regressions of the probability of recei- 
ving LA-subsidised care on the three definitions of income as observed in the ELSA 
sample. The vertical line in the graph indicates the value of the single person’s GC 
level plus 25%. Receipt of LA-funded care is virtually zero above this threshold 
on any of the definitions of assessable income. Below the threshold, receipt varies 
only a little according to the definition used. This suggests that we are able to 
capture the income component of the means test quite well and that varying the 
income definition used in constructing the corresponding covariates as defined in 
equation (5) in the receipt of care model would be unlikely to have much effect on 
the estimated coefficients. 
Figure B.2 graphs the locally weighted regressions of the probability of re- 
ceiving LA-subsidised care on the individuals’ ability to self-finance in terms of 
distance from the income threshold (YLA determined using option 3 above) and 
asset threshold. As one would expect, the dispersion on the financial dimension is 
far higher that the dispersion in income. 
2 
2 
2 
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FIGURE B.1 
Simulating means-test of LA-funded care 
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FIGURE B.2 
Receipt of publicly funded care by distance from the means test thresholds 
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